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 China sees Taiwan as nothing short of a final imperative in irredentism, a nationalistic rallying cry for the eradication of injustice inflicted upon her by imperial hegemonism of the past. Reunification of Taiwan would complete the coming of age for modern China, a great power ready to be at peace with herself yet equally prepared to reclaim its rightful suzerainty in East Asia. Bringing Taiwan into the fold would also undoubtedly have a salutary effect on China's efforts to integrate other independence-prone regions and ethnicities. A more cynical observer might even comment as to Beijing's need to eradicate Taiwan's autonomy as the consummation of its own legitimacy, a final solution, of sorts, to the last vestiges of the regime the Communist Party of China set out to overthrow more than 70 years ago. Whatever the calculus or psychology, the People's Republic of China has made clear that she can not and will not tolerate the indefinite de facto independence of Taiwan from its realm. More ominously, China has repeatedly belabored to demonstrate her will to act aggressively to achieve this goal, if necessary. As for the Republic of China (Taiwan), the last 50 years have been time hard-earned, through surviving political repression, military confrontation, and even the specter of global conflagration. Indigenous tenacity, empowered by American support and, yes, an occasional stroke of historical serendipity, have given the island the opportunity to transform itself into an economic success and an audacious experiment in democratization. An experiment which now entertains grander and commensurately riskier visions for the island's political future. As Taiwan inches towards populism and as the effects of decades of social-political separation from China begin to emerge, domestic dynamics are proving ever more resistant to the idea of reunification with the Mainland, either on a temporary (but indeterminate) basis or through the creation of an independent nation-state forever separated from China. That, of course, can be perceived by China as a latent provocation, even casus belli. There seems little margin for reconciliation at the moment, since reunification or even political accommodation under terms acceptable to one side would clearly be at odds with the principles and core national interests of the other. Therefore, resort to force remains an important option, to both sides. For Beijing, the military alternative avails the means to check Taiwanese independence, or as the obvious, if blunt, logic for solving the reunification problem, whereas Taipei, amidst its overpowering diplomatic isolation, has become increasingly dependent on its military deterrent as the pillar against subjugation through dialogue. Then there is the United States, whose role as the hegemonic power of our life time has managed to sustain a relative balance in the region ever since the Korean War. American might and largess have provided the decisive firebreak against Chinese adventurism and allowed Taiwan to flourish, but America's increasing need to grapple with the prospect of a Pax Sinica in the Western Pacific over the coming decades only highlights the ever narrowing range of security options for the island. While Taiwan's situation is not yet one of barbarians at the gates, contemplators of its military problem can certainly benefit from a little historical reflection. For those pondering the passage cited above, Prince Dorgon was unable to coerce the Ming minister into submission despite his graphic depiction of Manchurian military prowess. The courageous war minister eventually paid for this righteous loyalty with his life (as well as those of hundreds of thousands of Yangchow residents), though in so doing he captured the enduring admiration of a grateful Chinese nation. Taiwan's leaders (and populace) have little appetite for repeating or even emulating that tragic heroism, as they look across the waters at the growing mass of Chinese military power. Fortunately, they have had the luxury of 50 years to prepare a viable attritional defense, as was so eloquently articulated by one of Nationalist China's greatest military thinkers, Dr. David Yu. So, would Taiwan be strong enough to block a blitz? Or face down military duress? No one pretends to know for sure, but anyone who may care to pass a judgment on the matter must base his dialectic on information as close to objective and as free of distortion as possible. Our efforts here at Taiwan Defense Review is, therefore, aimed at the serious analyst who wishes to be unclouded by political rhetoric or technical inaccuracy in his endeavor to study the military dimension of one of the world's most vexing political challenges into the 21st Century.
There may come the day when a military solution to the Taiwan Problem will no longer be credible or even necessary. But as these feebly optimistic words are written, that day seems still far beyond our horizon. Even if such magnanimous time were finally to come to pass, the road to peace will certainly test Taiwan's capacity and rectitude to deter war. Until then, there must be vigilance.
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